In this article, I explore whether there might be two separable components to person-perception and interpersonal engagement in infancy: the ability to apprehend other people's attitudes on the one hand, and the ability to perceive actions on the other. In support of this approach, I summarize some evidence from a recent study of autistic adolescents' judgments of attitudes and actions manifest in moving point-light displays of people. I highlight the far-reaching cognitive as well associal-developmental implications of early interpersonal-affective engagement. I conclude by speculating that certain abnormalities that would stem from autistic individuals' impaired ability to perceive and engage with people's attitudes may be somewhat mitigated by their relative ability to perceive the actions of others.
In this theoretical article, I discuss how a prove misleading when characterizing the normal infant's capacity to perceive and re-nature of psychological functioning in early spond to other people's emotional attitudes childhood. On the other hand, it does not plays a vital role in early social and cogni-get us very far to pay lip-service to the inseptive development. I illustrate how it is in the arability of affect and cognition in infancy, domain of developmental psychopathol-if we fail to provide some alternative and ogy, specifically through the study of early more appropriate concepts to partition out childhood autism, that we may find evi-the separable components of infant psydence pointing to the special quality and de-chology. Such concepts should enable us to velopmental significance of interpersonal-see how in due course, thinking, feeling, affective perception and relatedness.
and so on emerge in their familiar adult One of the difficulties in approaching guises. these matters, is clarifying terms such as
In the past, I have dwelt upon the very "emotional attitudes" or "cognitive devel-young child's increasingly sophisticated opment." Part of the problem is that the awareness of "persons" as a major socialmeanings of these words may change radi-cognitive developmental achievement that cally when applied to different stages in de-yields the older child's concepts of "bodies" velopment. For example, the contrasts be-and "minds" (e.g., Hobson 1989; 1990c ; tween affect and cognition may be useful 1991). In this article, I pursue a related but when applied to adult psychology, yet may rather different thesis, that in shaping an account of early cognitive as well as social I am indebted to my colleagues Derek Moore and Tony development, we should adopt a frame of Lee for their collaboration in the empirical study I have reference couched in terms of an infant's described in this paper, and to Mike Tomasello for ability to perceive, respond to, and identify lively discussions on a number of topics, not least the w i t h t h e s u b j e c t i v e l y experienced and emosignificance of predication.
. "* ,,.., , " , ing wrote that "every idea contains a trans-rating evidence for such interpersonal coormuted affective attitude toward the bit of dination can be gleaned from observations reality to which it refers" (p. 8). This state-of the mutual patterning of adult-infant inment not only captures something about teractions in more natural circumstances, what it means to think (and, incidentally, although as in the case of neonatal imitaenables us to escape from the dead-end of tion, young infants' attentiveness and remethodological solipsism as espoused by sponsiveness to the movements and actions Fodor, 1980) , but it also points us toward of other people have been subject to alteran account of how thinking develops native interpretations (e.g., Brazelton, Kosthrough the human capacity to have and to lowski, & Main, 1974; Frye, Rawling, share attitudes toward the world. Moore, & Myers, 1983; Kaye, 1982 ; Stern, To begin with, I review a highly selective 1977; Sylvester-Bradley, 1985; Trevarthen, series of observations on normal infancy. I 1979). The dramatic effects on 3-monthdraw a distinction between two facets of olds of "perturbations" in the mutuality of this development which are often conflated: caregiver-infant exchanges induced, for exthe child's abilities to perceive, respond to, ample, by adults adopting a "still face" imitate, and identify with other people's ac- (Cohn & Tronick, 1983) or by experimenttions on the one hand, and the child's ability ers introducing feedback delays in TVto perceive, respond to, imitate, and iden-linked mother-infant transactions (Murray tify with other people's attitudes on the & Trevarthen, 1985) , strongly suggest that other. I suggest that there are separable young infants do perceive and react to components to these aspects of interper-adults' behavior toward themselves. Moresonal perception and engagement, and I over in experimental studies of young inhighlight the significance of the "attitude" fants' perceptual abilities, 3-to 5-monthcomponent for our account of early cogni-olds have demonstrated attentiveness to tive development. I also consider how the point-light displays of a walking person repstudy of early childhood autism may inform resented only as moving dots of light our perspective on these matters.
attached to the person's body and limbs, in preference to other randomly moving pointr\ XT 11? i ™ i • * lights or upside-down point-light people On Normal Early Development , n . ., , n -_.,*; " ~ °. . .v (e.g., Bertenthal, Proffitt & Cutting, 1984;  There is evidence that from very early in Fox & McDaniel, 1982) . This suggests that life, an infant perceives the presence and be-quite young infants are able to pick up ecohavior of other people as significant and logically significant information from the meaningful. Consider an infant's respon-biomechanical motion of the bodies of siveness to another person's actions. One other people. oft-cited phenomenon in this respect is that
Note that in such studies, there is often of neonatal imitation (e.g., Meltzoff, 1990 ; ambiguity over the kinds of person-related Meltzoff & Moore, 1977) . For example, meaning that may be salient and discrimina- Meltzoff and Moore (1983) confronted ble to young infants. To return to neonatal newborns with someone demonstrating imitation, for example, infants less than 2 mouth opening and tongue protrusion, and days-old have been presented with posed arranged for an observer who was blind to emotional expressions as well as actions the modeled behavior to judge the infants' (Field, 1985; Field et al., 1983; Field, videotaped responses. There were signifi-Woodson, Greenberg, & Cohen, 1982) . The cantly more infant mouth openings in re-infants were reported to show widened eyes sponses to the mouth display than to the and mouth opening in response to a model's tongue display, and more tongue protru-surprised face, lip widening to a happy face, sions to the tongue display (see Meltzoff & and tightened mouth with protruding lips Moore, 1989 , for a study with infants who accompanied by a furrowed brow to a sad also matched head movements). Corrobo-expression. Is this mimicking of "behav-ior," or does it involve the perception of garding observations on infants 9-12 feelings? Or again, in the aforementioned months-of-age, for here there is the widely observations of natural and perturbed recognized contrast between protoimperaadult-infant interactions, what importance tive and protodeclarative communicative should be assigned to an infant's perception functions (Bates, 1979 ; Bates, Benigni, of and responsiveness to an adult's emo- Bretherton, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1979 ; tional expressions? For that matter, how Bates, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1975 ; Camaimuch in the form and timing of behavior is oni, 1992). Protoimperatives are commuto count as "emotional"? Here it is relevant nicative acts such as requesting, which are that infants have been found to respond intended to induce someone else to do emotionally not only to disembodied vocal something; protodeclarative are acts such expressions of feeling (Sagi & Hoffman, as indicating or showing things, intended to 1976; Simner, 1971) , but also to another share experiences with (and/or engage the person's whole-body expressions. Haviland attitudes of) someone else. Even here, howandLelwica (1987) asked the mothers of 10-ever, where protodeclarative communicaweek-old infants to enact a range of af fee-tion is often characterized as a matter of the tive states in their facial and vocal expres-infant engaging someone else's "attention," sions during face-to-face exchanges with theoretical work on precursors to such intheir babies, and the infants reacted to each tersubjective engagement has been rather of the presentations with affective states of piecemeal. I shall return to this matter their own. These reactions were manifest shortly, but I emphasize how the range of not only in the infants' facial and other new accomplishments that emerge late in bodily gestures, but also in patterns of gaze the first year is made up of propensities and that were not presented by the mothers. So abilities that might be considered more or too, in more contrived experiments on so-less heavily weighted in their "action" and cial perception, infants 5-7 months-of-age "attitude" components. The list includes the have been reported to demonstrate selective infant's capacity to follow the eye gaze or attention to emotional information that is point of another person, to request actions invariant across vocal and visual presen-and to respond to simple verbal requests by tations of given affective expressions others, to indicate or show objects to others (Walker, 1982) , as well as to discriminate (often looking to the other person's eyes, to between dynamic face-voice expressions check whether he or she is attending), to inishown on videotape and among more static, tiate as well as accept invitations to games photographed facial expressions (Caron, such as peek-a-boo, to shake the head to ex Caron, & Myers, 1982; La Barbera, Izard, press refusal, to imitate conventional gesVietze.&Parisi, 1976; Young-Browne, Ro-tures (for example, hugging) and actions senfeld, & Horowitz, 1977) . We are led to with objects, to utter greetings ("Hi!") and reflect on what is essentially "emotional" in namelike words, and to pretend to carry out such discriminative abilities and to consider adult activities such as telephoning or the relation between infants' capacities for mopping the floor (Bretherton, McNew, & "action recognition" and "affect recogni-Beeghly-Smith, 1981; Trevarthen & Hubtion." ley, 1978) . This is also the period during My purpose in citing these observations which the infant shows "social referencing" and experiments is to highlight an issue that in seeking out a caregiver's affective expresis sometimes glossed over or neglected in ac-sion, relating this to the current situation, counts of early development: whether an in-and reacting accordingly in feeling as well as fant's capacity to perceive and react to other action (Campos & Stenberg, 1981 ; Feinpeople's actions is partly separable from the man, 1982; Feinman & Lewis, 1983 ; Klininfant's capacity to perceive and react to nert, Campos, Sorce, Emde, & Svejda, other people's attitudes. This kind of dis-1983). tinction has received more attention reThis catalogue of new communicative and cognitive abilities is far from homoge-of the attitudes and goal-directed actions neous. By requesting things and initiating that are manifest in others' expressions and games, the infant reveals a capacity to relate behavior. The infant also reacts to and acts in various ways to another person's inten-upon such attitudes and actions, for examtions and/or actions; by imitating conven-pie by assuming corresponding attitudes (as tional gestures and other behavior, the in-in sharing) or by imitating or thwarting othfant demonstrates an ability to adopt and ers' actions. This implies a motivational and execute the actions of another person. Very emotional investment in the various forms recently, a highly ingenious visual dishabit-of interpersonal engagement, uation experiment by Gergely, Nadasdy, Yet once again, the attitude-versusCsibra, and Biro (in press) yielded confir-action distinction points to a contrast bematory evidence that 12-month-olds can tween two potentially dissociable forms of identify an agent (in this case, a computer-social engagement. On the one hand, there generated circle behaving in humanlike is the mode of intersubjective engagement ways) and interpret the agent's actions in re-in which the infant registers and has an lation to its goal. What of the infant's ways emotionally patterned reaction to another of relating to people's attitudes? By show-person's (subjectively experienced) attiing objects and monitoring the other per-tudes. Here the paradigmatic case is an inson's bodily expressive responses, the infant fant's response to another's expressions of manifests some level of awareness that affect. For truly intersubjective contact, the "showing" may be necessary and potentially infant needs to maintain a focus on the sufficient to achieve a special kind of inter-source of the attitudes-that is, the other personal coordination and quite possibly, a person-and must not merely use the affect sense of sharing with another person, /fit is expressed to indicate the potential desirabilthe case that, at the end of the first year, an ity, danger, or whatever of the objects to infant is obeying and refusing, or adopting which that person is relating. A second adultlike sounds or gestures to express mode of engagement may involve the ingreetings and farewells (provided, that is, fant's perceiving, reacting to, and somethe infants are indeed expressing greetings times appropriating a person's actions, and farewells, even in restricted contexts), without a sense of intersubjective connectthen this seems to imply that the infant is edness to the other person. After all, a hucomplying with, opposing, and identifying man being can imitate nonhuman animals with the perceived attitudes of others, as well as certain machines, without any inWhen in circumstances of social referenc-terindividual sharing or coordination of ing, the infant adopts someone else's evalu-mental states. ation of an object or event-for example, I intend to highlight the implications of avoiding a toy toward which an adult has this perspective for our account of the early shown disgust (Hornik, Risenhoover, & development of symbolic thought and lanGunnar, 1987; Walden & Ogan, 1988 )-the guage. I also provide some justification for infant shows how he or she has a propensity the approach by citing some relevant evito assume the other person's attitude to-dence from a recent experimental investigaward a particular target situated in a shared tion with autistic individuals, world.
In each of these cases, it is a moot point . Lee, 1994) , which suggest that in autism we essary and perhaps sufficient, is that the in-may find a relative dissociation between the fant registers and interprets the directedness ability to perceive people's actions on the one hand, and the ability to perceive (and two occasions. The group difference was engage with) people's feelings and emotion-not caused by a failure to respond by autisrelated attitudes on the other. tic individuals. On each and every item, all Groups of 13 autistic and nonautistic re-participants of each group made reference tarded participants were pairwise matched to meaningful content in what was defor chronological age and verbal mental age picted, in nearly every case either to emoas assessed by the British Picture Vocabu-tion or to actions and movements of the lary Scale (Dunn, Dunn, &Whetton, 1982) . arms and legs of the point-light person. In fact, we also included a mental age-Typical responses for the autistic group matched group of normal children, but I were "walking and sitting down on a chair" shall not consider them further except to for sad, "standing up and moving backstate that their performance was closely ward" for scared, and "walking and jogging similar to that of the nonautistic control and shaking his arms" for angry. Unlike group.
control participants, they attended to (beThe technique was to present brief video-came psychologically engaged with) and retape sequences of a moving person visible marked on the actions, but not the attionly as points of light emanating from re-tudes, of the point-light person, flective patches attached to the person's
The succeeding task was designed to exlimbs and body, a technique pioneered by plore the accuracy with which participants Johansson (1973) . There was an introduc-were able to name actions and emotional or tory procedure in which subjects were emotion-related psychological states in shown a fully visible person who was subse-point-light displays of a person, when they quently seen walking in "point-light" form were asked specific questions in these rein darkness, and then reilluminated. All spects. In this case, the separate 5-s displays subjects were able to grasp how a person involved 10 nonemotional actions (lifting, was being represented. The task involved chopping, hopping, kicking, jumping, the presentation of separate 5-s sequences pushing, digging, sitting, climbing, and of the point-light person enacting gestures running) and 10 gestures and actions that of surprise, sadness, fear, anger, and happi-had emotionally expressive content (the five ness, respectively. For example, the "sad" basic emotions employed in the first experiperson walked forward slowly, sighed, sat ment, and the states of itchiness, boredom, down on a chair limply, lifted his hands tiredness, cold, and hurt). The nonemoslowly, and put his head in his hands. Parti-tional actions were presented in one videocipants were told, "You're going to see some tape, and the emotion-related states were bits of film of a person moving. I want you presented in another, with a counterbalto tell me about this person. Tell me what's anced order to the presentation of the vidhappening." We took care to phrase eotapes. For the "actions" videotape, the prompts in terms of "what was happening," experimenter said, "I want you to tell me and made no reference to feelings nor ac-what the person is doing"; for the "attitions. Our prediction was that autistic indi-tudes" videotape, he said, "I want you to tell viduals would differ from control subjects me what the person is feeling" in remarking on the actions, rather than the At the outset, we had intended to exclude emotional attitudes, of the person depicted, from the analysis of results those items that Our predictions were borne out by the re-yielded ceiling or floor effects. This applied suits. Whereas 10 out of 13 autistic individ-to the actions of kicking and jumping, and uals failed to refer to emotional states the emotions of surprise and boredom, re-(whether correctly or incorrectly) on all five spectively. The results on the remaining presentations of the basic emotions, only items were that the nonemotion and emoone of the nonautistic mentally retarded tion conditions were equally difficult for participants performed in this way, and the the nonautistic retarded subjects. Moremajority referred to emotions on at least over, there was not a significant difference between autistic and nonautistic subjects on cance of biologically based interpersonal the nonemotion (actions) task. In contrast coordination, and especially affective coorto this result, the autistic subjects achieved dination, for a child's growing understandsignificantly lower scores on the task in-ing that people have their own subjective volving judgements of emotion-related states of mind (e.g., Hobson, 1990c Hobson, , 1990b , states (following the finding of a significant 1991, 1993b). On the other hand, it has regroup-by-condition interaction on ANOVA, mained an open question how far a young an independent / test with a Bonferroni child might come to understand personscorrection yielded t = 4.0, df = 24, p < with-minds on the basis of capacities to per-.005). The two groups differed significantly ceive and respond to actions, rather than in their abilities to name the point-light dis-bodily expressed subjective states, manifest plays depicting happiness, fear, sadness, in the behavior of others. This distinction is itchiness, and anger, so that the results re-neither clear nor absolute, insofar as the fleeted far-reaching impairments in autistic perception and understanding of actions subjects' ability to recognize attitudes, not may encompass more than a grasp of goalmerely selective deficits in naming so-called directedness that one could attribute to ma-"cognitive" emotions dependent upon be-chines, and might extend to notions about liefs (Baron-Cohen, Spitz, & Cross, 1993). a person's subjectively grounded intentions In summary, the study yielded evidence behind such actions (e.g., Premack, 1991) . for a remarkable specificity in autistic indi-Nevertheless, as the difference between providuals' lesser attentiveness to and impaired todeclarative and protoimperative commudiscrimination of emotion-related attitudes nication illustrates, this may be a distinction in the gestures of people, as represented in worth pursuing (Camaioni, 1992 ; Gomez, whole-body, point-light videotape displays. Sarria, & Tamarit, 1993; Hobson, 1994) . The autistic subjects could recognize certain There are a number of theoretical works person-related meanings even in such "ab-that have a bearing upon this issue. For exstract" (but ecologically valid) biomechani-ample, Trevarthen (1982) contrasts the incal representations, but these meanings had terpersonal and practical aims of infants, to do with actions rather than subjective but he tends to class together the infant's states. The findings are relevant for ac-"primary motives for transmission of feelcounts of autistic individuals' impairments ings and purposes between human subjects" in understanding as well as perceiving "per- (Trevarthen, 1982, p. 85) . In an analysis of sons" as beings with their own subjective the Language Acquisition Support System, orientations to the world (e.g., Hobson, Bruner (1983) stresses the role of the con-1993). Moreover, autistic children's relative ventional format, "a routinized and refailure to attend to and identify with such peated interaction in which an adult and attitudes is likely to have far-reaching con-child do things to and with each other" (p. sequences for their capacity to adopt the 132, Bruner's italics). In fact, such "doing" attitudes of other people, and thereby to includes achieving joint attention as well as distance themselves from their own "ego-joint action, and Bruner is concerned with centric" attitudes to the world.
"referring" as much as he is with "requesting." Bruner claims that the intent to refer, T .. .. " ~ ... , as well as the recognition of that intent in Impl,ca..ons for Cogn, .ve and unlearned (Bruner, 1983, pp . 122-Languagc Development 1 2 3 ) ft Î have been focusing on whether there are reading a person's intent or goal-directedseparate "action" and "attitude" compo-ness is one thing, and understanding the nents to person perception and responsiv-particular goal that is intended, namely the ity. If so, this fact is likely to shed light on goal of referring or communicating, is anthe origins of interpersonal understanding other. (or in modern parlance, "theory of mind").
Consider once again how an infant may In previous work, I have stressed the signifl-be able to perceive actions with goals, for example, reaching for something with the and other involves much more than the kind goal of grasping the object, or bringing of ability present in 3-month-olds who regfood to one's mouth with the goal of eating ister when they are "out of tune" with someit. It is logically and perhaps psychologi-one else. There is something quite different cally possible to perceive the goal of an ac-about perceiving and reacting to others' attion without conceiving of an agent with titudes to oneself, perceiving and reacting that goal, or a fortiori, without conceiving to others' attitudes to the world, and conof an agent who has the intention to achieve ceiving and representing other persons (and the goal. An individual also might perceive oneself) as beings who have subjective attiand be inclined to mimic and/or imitate the tudes. My thesis is that the following are esgoal-directed actions of others, and by sential prerequisites for the transition from some admixture of first-person experience the early forms of one-to-one primary interof the infant's own goal-directed actions subjectivity to the acquisition of an initial and his/her perception and appropriation understanding of the nature of self vis-a-vis of the actions of others, come to some more other persons around 18 months-of-age. explicit understanding of what it means for First, there is the 9-month-old's capacity to actions to be goal-directed (see Russell, perceive the directedness of other people's 1994, for thoughtful discussion of agency in attitudes, as manifest in social referencing early mental development). On the other and protodeclarative communication. Sechand, certain actions and gestures have a ond, there is the business of identifying with very special kind of goal, namely the goal other people's attitudes, assuming their subof communicating with someone else. Such jective orientations, whether covertly or communicating may take many forms, of overtly in imitation. (Here the claim is that course-making and breaking contact as in perceiving the directedness of actions, as greetings and farewells, referring to things, well as imitating actions, may draw on some informing and persuading, teasing, repudi-similar psychological mechanisms, but that ating, and so on, and it includes the need to perceiving and assuming attitudes involves convey that one intends to communicate something more.) I take it that these abili- (Grice, 1957) . In previous writings, I have ties and propensities are givens of human argued that to communicate with someone psychology. Now that the infant is in a posior to refer for someone entails that the tion to relate to given, visually specified obsomeone is recognized as a person with jects and events according to how the infant whom psychological sharing is possible reacts to the situation and according to an- (Hobson, 1993c) . This recognition entails other person's attitude to the situation, the that an infant registers (not necessarily con-infant is in a position to notice that attitudes ceptualizes) other people's emotional states toward things are different from the things and reacts to expressions of feeling with co-themselves-provided two further condiordinated (not necessarily concordant) feel-tions are met. The first condition is that the ings of his or her own. In other words, an infant must register the difference between understanding of the goal to communicate his/her own attitudes and attitudes perrequires both an understanding of what it ceived in and sometimes taken from others, means to intend to do something and an un-The second condition is that the infant derstanding of what it means to align or co-needs to adopt an attitude to his/her own ordinate one's subjective orientation with attitudes. As Mead (1934) originally sugthat of another person. The latter form of gested, and as Hobson (1990a) and Tomaunderstanding could not arise (so the argu-sello (1993) have recently discussed, this latment goes) except through experience of ter accomplishment may depend on the person-to-person intersubjective linkage infant identifying with the other's attitude and differentiation, experience that comes to him/herself.
by virtue of innate capacities for interper-
The developmental implications of these sonal-affective exchange.
processes and events, which occupy the peConceptual differentiation between self riod from approximately 9-18 months or so, are far-reaching for cognitive and lin-knowledge Alan Leslie's (in press) theoretiguistic as well as social development. I have cal approach, which is closely related to my tried to trace these implications in other own thesis and is similarly well-placed to acwritings (especially Hobson, 1993c) , and commodate the evidence from autism dehere I shall merely signpost some of the ar-scribed earlier. Leslie attributes an infant's eas in which the child's world has been radi-knowledge of agency to three distinct "procally altered by his/her ability not only to cessing subsystems" concerned with meassume, but also to become aware of assum-chanical agency, actional agency, and attiing, the attitudes of others toward a shared tudinal agency. It is this latter distinction world. In the domain of interpersonal un-between two aspects of the intentional derstanding ("theory of mind"), the child properties of agents with which I have been conceptualizes how the child is a "self concerned. The former involves agents actamong other selves, so that he or she can ing in pursuit of goals (as represented), and knowingly accommodate to the attitudes, the latter concerns attitudes to thetruth of preferences, and mental states of others in propositions about states of affairs (in Lessophisticated role taking and acts of empa-lie's terminology; I do not think that invokthy (Hoffman, 1984; Kagan, 1982) . In the ing the notion of "truth" is appropriate for domain of creative symbolic play, the characterizing the nature of mental state child's insight into the distinction between understanding in 1-and 2-year-olds, but let "thought" (attitude) and "thing" means that that be). Leslie also anchored pretend play he or she can intentionally transfer attitudes and informative communication in an infrom one object or situation to another, and fant's grasp of attitudinal rather than acchoose to imbue play materials with novel tional agency. meanings (Leslie, 1987; Hobson, 1990c) . In
The critical point about the perception of the domain of language, the child's new-attitudinal agency (Leslie's terms), or about found grasp of the ways in which words are infants' perception of and engagement with anchored to the particular aspect of mean-attitudes in increasingly sophisticated and ing-for-persons that a person is intending to cognitively elaborated forms of intersubjecexpress, is constitutive of the ability to com-tive exchange (my terms), is that here we prehend and make predicative utterances, discern the bases for children's concepts of The very possibility of articulating com-what it is to be a person with subjectively exments about a referred-to object or event perienced mental states and psychological arises when the child comes to appreciate orientations to the world. The ability to perthe manifold thoughts that can be enter-ceive and imitate actions, even goal-directed tained and communicated (by and to imag-actions, might itself lead infants to register ined persons in different psychological ori-correspondences between other people and entations) in relation to given, shared themselves, and might even anchor an unsituations. It is no coincidence that the ref-derstanding of certain linguistic expressions erence-to-predication shift in language (see Tomasello & Barton, in press) . It is, (e.g., Bates, 1993) occurs in conjunction however, very difficult to see how this alone with these other changes around 18 months could yield an understanding of others as of age. subjects of experience who communicate Even if these sweeping claims about the with each other (for arguments against reabasis for the cognitive revolution at approx-soning by analogy from the self's own expeimately 18 months are justified, we must riences, for example, see Hobson, 1991) . still establish how appropriate it is to give Without such understanding of subjective such prominence to infant's abilities to per-mental life, and without a grasp of how the ceive, and propensities to identify with, the world can fall under different descriptions attitudes of other people. We seem to have for different people (and for oneself^ creleft behind the parallel account of infants ative symbolic functioning and language perceiving and imitating others' actions. Be-would be severely compromised, fore addressing this issue, I need to acThis returns us to the nature and origins of thought and to the quote from Vygotsky suggesting that specific impairments in af-(1962) with which I began this article. To fectively patterned intersubjective engageput it bluntly, we shall never understand ment may lie at the source of these chilhow thought is always "about" something, dren's relative lack of "joint-attention," nor how thought originates in human devel-protodeclarative communication, and symopment, unless we appreciate how thoughts bolic play, and may even account for their about things are abstracted from attitudes specific profile of abnormalities in language toward things-as-experienced. Or to ap-and thinking (Hobson, 1993c) . I shall not proach the matter differently, our account pursue the details of that account here, even of a child's understanding of propositional though I believe it helps justify what might attitudes-what it means to think or believe have seemed unlicensed speculation in some or wish that such-and-such is the c a s e -parts of this paper. Instead, I turn the arguneeds to be an account of how the child ment around, and reflect on the striking evicomes to recognize that because of the na-dence for certain abilities in the autistic inture of people's attitudes (or what it means dividuals we have been testing. Not only to construe things according to meanings-could our autistic subjects perceive meanfor-persons), the world and imagined possi-ingful point-light Gestalten presented on ble worlds can be characterized in various videotape, but they attended to and named ways that may be thought about, believed, the actions of the people portrayed. This wished for, and so on. If this suggestion is finding may reveal an area of social ability correct, then it follows that the develop-in autism that has considerable practical as ment of specifically human forms of higher well as theoretical significance. We are accognitive functioning depends on develop-customed to highlighting the marked and ments in interpersonal relations and inter-characteristic disabilities of people with aupersonal understanding in the earliest tism, but many such people also acquire imphases of life. pressive (if patchy) cognitive and linguistic abilities. We need to understand how they achieve what they do, as well as to explain Conclusions t h e s o c i a l a n d i n t e n e ctual difficulties they I have drawn attention to a potentially sig-face. Autistic children's abilities to perceive nificant theoretical distinction between a actions might provide a route to underyoung child's ability to perceive and re-standing something about other people and spond to another person's bodily expressed even people's minds, and may assist their attitudes and the ability to perceive and re-struggle (as it often seems to be) to acquire spond to another person's actions. Al-language and to engage in reflective though I have not attempted to map out the thought, especially when the impediments developmental implications that follow to truly intersubjective contact are not too from drawing this distinction, I hope that severe. Moreover, as colleagues and myself the pointers I provided in discussing the are currently investigating, the perplexing roots of protodeclarative gestures and refer-mixture of imitative abilities and disabilities ence and of symbolic functioning and Ian-in autistic children (reviewed in Hobson, guage, are sufficient to indicate the poten-1993c), for example in their relatively better tial importance of an infant's perception of performance in copying goal-directed actions and engagement with other people's atti-than in mimicking meaningless body movetudes.
ments or bodily expressions of affect, may be Our experiment with autistic individuals explicable in terms of their relative ability to may serve to illustrate the potential value of perceive actions vis-a-vis bodily expressed atstudies in developmental psychopathology titudes. Because interpersonal engagement for separating out potentially dissociable has a strongly motivational component, we facets of psychological functioning. In-may also be led to see why autistic children deed, the evidence that emerged is in keep-often fail to react to or imitate certain of the ing with a theoretical approach to autism expressive gestures and actions of other peo-pie, whereas they appear to notice and sometimes to adopt other kinds of action and even communicative expression. Even more important, we may begin to discern the reasons for their lack of interest and investment in, as well as limited appreciation of, the emotional and cognitive dimensions of human cultural life (Hobson, 1993c; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993) .
This line of reasoning may not be correct in all its particulars, but it exemplifies how theoretical as well as empirical study in the field of development psychopathology may lead to new perspectives on both normal and abnormal psychological functioningin the present case, on specific facets of interpersonal perception and affective engagement that may prove to have great significance for early cognitive as well as social development.
